Thursday, October 29, 2009

Value

The Wikipedia article about Pitchfork mentions how the site has been criticized by some for what is perceived as that sites control over people's musical preferences. In short, it was claimed that a positive/negative review on Pitchfork has a massive effect on the success of the artist under review, because the site sets an influential example for how a particular work can be received.

I've been thinking a lot about this issue and about the value of shared aesthetic preferences. If Pitchfork does have the power that it has been accused of having, what are the consequences of this for society and individuals?

First off, it seems pretty much clear from the start that shared aesthetic values are important. Enjoying a piece of art with others (mutually revelling in aesthetic enjoyment) is certainly a bonding experience that can link minds by suggesting a similarity of experience between two or more people. Although it is certainly possible to enjoy others aesthetic preferences for their own sake (when we don't share them ourselves), a qualitatively different type of experience is offered by the mutual enjoyment of the same piece of art.

Also clear is the fact that aesthetic experiences are variable in terms of their intensity; i.e., they are not just good or bad, but vary in the intensity with which they are good or bad. This occurs at the level of the individual person, it is not objectively true. What I mean by this is that, to use the framework of Maturana and Varela, the aesthetic experience of art is something that occurs as a result of a coupling between a person and a work of art. Although it could be easily argued that there is also a coupling on a wider social level between a work of art and a society in general-in that a particular society is predisposed to accept certain works of art over others based on the preferences and values of its constituent members-the aesthetic experience of art being explored here is that which occurs on the individual level.

To return to the theme of Pitchfork, I'm wondering what the role of that site (and others like it) is in manipulating people in such a way as to change their potential for aesthetic enjoyment-in other words to change their predisposition to certain art. It would seem that a site like Pitchfork has the potential to act as an organizer of aesthetic preferences for individuals. This is how this would be achieved: First, the site achieves some level of credibility amongst individuals-perhaps this occurs directly, as a result of making individuals aware of music that they immediately like. Once this credibility has been established, further recommendations from the site will be taken more seriously. If the site has been particularly successful in showing its readers art they enjoy, it (the site) will have more freedom in terms of what art its readers will be willing to take seriously.

The things I have just said pertain to art criticism sites like pitchfork, but the same things could be said about an individual who affects the taste of others. Unique to Pitchfork however is that it is not a person, but rather an organization resulting from the collaboration of many people. Consequently, although it is able to attain the same credibility as a person (e.g. a knowledgeable music listener who gives valued recommendations to friends), it also benefits from the fact that it is perceived by its readers as the outcome of the aesthetic preferences of many people-an "in" group-and is therefore more formidable than most individuals.

To be continued...

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

Social Panic

A recurrent feature in my social life-that is my life in the social domain-is an uncomfortable situation caused by a conflict between two social constraints upon my action. One one hand, as I move about in the social domain, my awareness of the potential meaningfulness of my actions leads me to be aware of my surroundings so that I my temper my conduct with respect to what I perceive, with the goal of maintaining some desired relation to my surrounding social world.

However, ever so often I face a situation whose solution (the course of action that will resolve the situation in a desirable way) is in some other way problematic. For instance, if when walking down the street, I see an acquaintance, it is my usual desire to acknowledge this by saying e.g. "hello". If the acquaintance is more than 20 feet or so away, I am forced to account for the fact that quietly saying hello is unreasonable-especially if it is noisy out. As a result, I have several options: to raise my voice, wait until the person is closer, or give a greeting that is too quiet to hear. Each of these is problematic in that they will be intrinsically meaningful in their own ways-even as they solve the original problem.

By raising my voice I will satisfy my desire to greet the friend, but in doing so, engage in an activity (yelling) that has other social connotations which may conflict with the message I want to convey. If I wait until the friend gets closer, I will solve the problem presented by the distance, but in doing so will do nothing to fulfill my desire to be sociable towards my friend. As I approach the friend silently, I position myself in an ambiguous zone of social relations towards my friend-I may not be planning to greet them, I may be waiting, whatever the case, my positioning is ambiguous to my friend. This is an uncomfortable position to be in, because such ambiguous zones may catalyze (in the friend) several different courses of action. The friend is forced to attempt to interpret the ambiguous performance I am giving, and may interpret my actions in the "wrong" way-a way different from what I myself intend.

THe reason that this situation is so undesirable is that we do not look appetizingly on the possibility of reacting to ways of acting that are beyond our control. We act in certain ways towards others so that we may enjoy a particular social positioning. There are courses of action that we don't take because we don't want to face the social consequences of acting in these ways. When are actions make our intentions ambiguous, we enter a realm in which undesirable responses form others are made more likely.

Thus, such situations place us in a bind: though we want to position ourselves in a certain way, the possible courses of action that we have for achieving such a positioning would actually make our positioning ambiguous because these actions have additional significance-in addition to offering solutions to the present problem.