My research work as an undergraduate, and now as a graduate student has been frequently concerned with children’s developing understanding of number, or phrased differently, with their developing ability to use numbers. This topic is one that I’ve come to as a result of chance, and have stuck with as a result of the comparative ease of doing work in an area that I’m familiar with, more than with any overarching interest.
A good deal of research in this area is done by researchers who ask young preschooler’s numerical questions that involve numbers, and can be answered by using counting, or basic logical reasoning. These situations involve an interesting juxtaposition of knowledge and ignorance on the behalf of the researchers. On one hand, the researchers put themselves in these situations (in preschools, daycare centers, home environments, etc.) because of their ignorance about children’s developing numerical thinking. On the other hand, once in these situations, the researchers ask children questions that in many cases they already know the answer to. Researcher’s do not go to children because they can’t count, or because they want to know the mathematical result of an addition or subtraction operation. They know the “objective” answers to these questions, and are instead interested in whether or not children know them.
The situation described above involves, depending on your interpretation, either dishonesty, or an asymettrical form of communication. What do the children involved think of this situation? The most ideal state of affairs, as far as the research is concerned, is for children to assume that the question asked of them is one that the researcher genuinely doesn’t know, and needs their help with. In such a situation, a child’s behavior is driven solely by the desire to get the “right” answer. Of course, this may not be how things actually are. Is it actually reasonable to think that children believe that the researcher really needs help answering the question they have been asked? This question can’t be answered without knowing what children think these questions are about in the first place, and there’s an abundance of evidence that 3-4 years olds don’t understand what type of answer a given numerical question is seeking, let alone how to reach that answer.
It may be that children’s understanding of the nature of social situations outstrips their understanding of numbers. This might lead them to grasp the pretense nature of research situations before they can correctly answer the questions asked therein. If so, then the issue is once again what children think that goal of the question is. In other words, if they understand the pretense nature of the situation, and they are compliant, their response will reflect their best ideas about how to answer the question.
Both of the above considerations indicate that there may be an interaction between (a), children’s understanding of the situation (pretense or serious), and (b), their interpretation of the problem. That is, children’s understanding of the situation may shape their developing understanding of the nature of the problem. Conversely, their developing understanding of the problem may shape their understanding of the situation. Just as a small number of possible answers may be found for algebraic equations with multiple variables, so too may a consideration of the possibilities above lead to a narrowing down of possible conclusions.
The question of whether children understand the element of pretense in research designs is contingent on how they understand the question. Certain types of questions make pretense a realistic interpretation, while in others, it makes no sense. If children see numerical questions as commands for them to perform a certain series of behaviors, then the realization that there is an element of pretense would never arise. Such children wouldn’t see the situation as involving the researcher’s desire for a question to be answered, but as involving their giving a performance. They would see the act itself as the object of the situation, rather than as a means to an end. Conversely, if it can be established that children understand the pretense nature of the research situation, then this would indicate a different understanding of the question, namely, one in which pretense makes sense.
The relationship between children’s understanding of numerical questions and their understanding of the situation in which these questions are asked is not just important to figure out at any given point in development. The relation between these two things determines the nature of the developmental process itself. The development of numerical thinking involves not only a developing understanding of counting and numerical logic, but also an understanding of the goals of the situations in which this is used. Children who are oblivious to a researcher’s/teacher’s/parent’s pretense will make sense of numerical situations in a very different way from those who grasp pretense.
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
Monday, February 13, 2012
The nature of mental illness
The APA (American Psychiatric Association) has recently announced a new diagnostic manual (the DSM 5) which, among other things, introduces new "mental illnesses" for psychiatrists to diagnose. The choice of words in the last sentence, which may sound awkward, was intended to demonstrate the strange practices that the psychiatric association partakes in. Although I may be wrong, I am relatively confident in saying that the role played by the DSM in Psychiatry is significantly larger than the role of similar texts in other areas of medicine. While other doctors do find new conditions and illnesses, only in psychiatry is the issue of what constitutes an illness a major concern. This uncertainty is what makes the announcement of a new version of the DSM, and the "new illnesses" therein such a significant moment.
Many others have commented and criticized the new DSM for the inclusion of a number of new conditions. For example, the manual treats the depression that follows a loss, shyness in children, oppositional/defiant and apathetic behavior in children as new forms of mental illness. These have changed from being ordinary characteristics of life into abnormal "sick" states. Most of the criticism levelled against these new conditions claims that they're based on inappropriate influences from drug companies, or reflect an inappropriate desire to eliminate the ordinary diversity of the human condition.
Here I want to make a different sort of criticism. Many of the conditions identified by the DSM reflect issues in the social realm. Being oppositional or defiant is necessarily social, as is shyness. Furthermore, depression and apathy, while possible individual feelings, often occur for people within social contexts (though they could occur for “desert island” people too). Because these occur in a social context, it is only within this context that they can be understood. In other words, the processes involving “oppositional-defiance disorder” run through entire social contexts; they are not limited to individuals. Yet, psychiatry attempts to deal with these things as if they were individual problems. THe individual is separated from society, taken to the psychiatrist. There, in isolation, the psychiatrist attempts to understand the problem in terms of the individual. Treating mental phenomena that occur on the interpersonal realm by looking at individuals who are presumed to be at the center of these phenomena is like trying to understand the audience experience at a concert by studying the band alone. Such an approach cannot work. To understand the experience of a concert, one must study both the music/band, and the audience.
The psychological processes that reflect generalized versions of “oppositional defiance disorder” or shyness disorder are certainly distinct things--this can be granted. However, for something to be distinct it doesn’t follow that all of its elements must be distinct form the elements of all other things. For example, two songs for the piano may be distinct, even if they involve all of the same notes. The differences emerge at a higher level in terms of the vertical and horizontal arrangement of the notes. The same principle is true for other generative phenomena--language, DNA, etc. To bring this example to the realm of psychiatry, mental phenomena that exist as qualitatively distinct on the social level are not necessarily made up of distinct component processes. The component processes may simply be ordinary ones that have combined in a certain way to yield a certain result. Therefore, when a “mental illness” has been identified which manifests itself on the social level, there is no reason to expect that the optimal way to return to a healthy mental state is to change something on the level of the “afflicted” individual. The problem may not be with any of the component parts of the situation (the individuals involved) but with the results of their combination. A new view of psychological problems becomes available when we think of them as possibly deriving from unfortunate combinations of otherwise healthy, ordinary mental processes.
Many others have commented and criticized the new DSM for the inclusion of a number of new conditions. For example, the manual treats the depression that follows a loss, shyness in children, oppositional/defiant and apathetic behavior in children as new forms of mental illness. These have changed from being ordinary characteristics of life into abnormal "sick" states. Most of the criticism levelled against these new conditions claims that they're based on inappropriate influences from drug companies, or reflect an inappropriate desire to eliminate the ordinary diversity of the human condition.
Here I want to make a different sort of criticism. Many of the conditions identified by the DSM reflect issues in the social realm. Being oppositional or defiant is necessarily social, as is shyness. Furthermore, depression and apathy, while possible individual feelings, often occur for people within social contexts (though they could occur for “desert island” people too). Because these occur in a social context, it is only within this context that they can be understood. In other words, the processes involving “oppositional-defiance disorder” run through entire social contexts; they are not limited to individuals. Yet, psychiatry attempts to deal with these things as if they were individual problems. THe individual is separated from society, taken to the psychiatrist. There, in isolation, the psychiatrist attempts to understand the problem in terms of the individual. Treating mental phenomena that occur on the interpersonal realm by looking at individuals who are presumed to be at the center of these phenomena is like trying to understand the audience experience at a concert by studying the band alone. Such an approach cannot work. To understand the experience of a concert, one must study both the music/band, and the audience.
The psychological processes that reflect generalized versions of “oppositional defiance disorder” or shyness disorder are certainly distinct things--this can be granted. However, for something to be distinct it doesn’t follow that all of its elements must be distinct form the elements of all other things. For example, two songs for the piano may be distinct, even if they involve all of the same notes. The differences emerge at a higher level in terms of the vertical and horizontal arrangement of the notes. The same principle is true for other generative phenomena--language, DNA, etc. To bring this example to the realm of psychiatry, mental phenomena that exist as qualitatively distinct on the social level are not necessarily made up of distinct component processes. The component processes may simply be ordinary ones that have combined in a certain way to yield a certain result. Therefore, when a “mental illness” has been identified which manifests itself on the social level, there is no reason to expect that the optimal way to return to a healthy mental state is to change something on the level of the “afflicted” individual. The problem may not be with any of the component parts of the situation (the individuals involved) but with the results of their combination. A new view of psychological problems becomes available when we think of them as possibly deriving from unfortunate combinations of otherwise healthy, ordinary mental processes.
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